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Introduction
Hourly  labour  productivity,  along  with  average  hours  worked,  the  employment  rate  and  the
working-age population as a share of the total population, is one of the accounting aggregates that
determine per capita GDP. Yet  according to many analyses,  hourly labour productivity in several
European countries is much the same as or even higher than in the United States, while per capita
GDP is markedly lower (see Cette 2004, 2005 for a summary of this work). In quantitative terms, the
difference can be put down to higher average hours worked and/or a higher employment rate in the
United  States.  This  suggests  that  the  United  States  is  no  longer  setting  the  “technical  efficiency
frontier”1 now defined by these European countries. In other words, some of the other industrialised
countries  have already closed the productivity gap.  By “opting” for shorter  working hours and/or
lower employment rates, the European countries with high hourly productivity would also seem to be
promoting more of a leisure society than the United States. The obvious question, addressed in what is
becoming  a  wealth  of  literature,2 is  whether  this  greater  emphasis  on  leisure  in  Europe  is  the
expression of genuine social and collective preferences, or the outcome of the combined effects of
regulatory provisions that curb labour-market participation by the working-age population and of tax
provisions that act as financial disincentives to such participation.
The  above  analysis  would  be  valid  assuming  constant  returns  to  hours  worked  and  the
employment rate. Yet recent econometric work (for example by Belorgey, Lecat and Maury, 2004) on
panels of countries has shown sharply diminishing returns to both parameters. This would mean that
differences in hours worked and/or employment rates in many European countries push up hourly
productivity there compared with the United States.  The analysis proposed by Cette  (2004, 2005)
consisted in correcting “observed” hourly productivity by factoring in the differences in average hours
worked  and/or  the  employment  rate  (compared  with  the  United  States)  stemming  from  these
diminishing returns, in order to obtain “structural” hourly productivity. It then emerged that, with the
exception of some highly specific small countries (e.g. Norway), structural productivity levels in every
country  were  lower  than in  the  United  States,  which  would  in  fact  still  appear  to  be  setting  the
“technical efficiency frontier”.
Taking this analysis further, the present study focuses on refining the measurement of the effects
of the employment-rate gap on productivity by breaking down the working-age population by sex and
age into six categories (with three age groups: 15-24, 25-54 and 55–64). This is because it is possible
that diminishing returns to the employment rate vary across these categories, and it emerges that the
gaps with the United States are not evenly spread but concern specific working-age population groups,
i.e. the  young,  older  workers  or  women.  This  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  panel  of  OECD
countries  from 1992  to  2002.  The  numerous  problems  of  simultaneity  between  the  variables  are
addressed by using instrumental variables.
The results should be viewed with the usual caution. They are associated with a large number of
simplifying assumptions and should accordingly be viewed as realistic orders of magnitude rather than
precise measurements. Of these assumptions, those of uniform returns to employment rates and hours
worked are probably very robust. They suggest, for instance, that the returns to the employment rate of
all six categories of the working-age population remain unchanged, whether the initial employment
rate in that category is 20% or 70%.
We should point out that this study of the effect on productivity of the employment rate by sex
and age is not directly comparable with the findings of studies on the productivity effects of the sex
and age profile of the working population. Our study looks at the effects on productivity of the gender
and age structure of the working-age population broken down into insiders and outsiders (i.e. those in
or outside the labour market), rather than the effects on productivity of the age and gender structure of
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insiders  alone. Among the recent empirical studies on the effects that the structure of the employed
population has on productivity, Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) find that the productivity of women is
less than that of men, and an age effect that is ambiguous (possibly quadratic); Aubert and Crépon
(2003) find an age effect that is not really significant.3 We should also point out that one explanation
occasionally put forward for the effect of age on productivity is the diffusion and rapid renewal of new
technologies, which may reinforce phenomena relating to the erosion of human capital with age (for
this, see for instance Aubert, Caroli and Roger, 2004).
This study begins by recalling the insights gleaned from a range of comparative measurements of
“observed” hourly productivity, before moving on to estimate the returns to hours worked and the
employment  rate,  this  second  parameter  being considered  first  at  an  aggregate  level  and then  by
category of the working-age population. The study then measures “structural” hourly productivity,
adjusting  for  the  effects  of  differences  in  hours  worked  and  the  employment  rate  on  “observed”
productivity, and ends with some concluding remarks.
Apparent labour productivity in the major industrialised countries
The international comparisons available on labour productivity are contrasting4 but the evidence
they provide appears to be robust to the inevitable statistical uncertainty (Table 1):
Table 1. Productivity, per hour and per worker, in 2002
Country
Productivity per hour
as a % of the United States level
Productivity per worker
as a % of the United States level
OECD
[a]
Groningen
[b]
Eurostat
[c]
OECD
[d]
Groningen
[e]
Eurostat
[f]
United States 100 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 100.0
European Union1 82 89.5 78 78.5
Euro zone 92 90.9 83 78.5
Japan 71 75.8 69.6 75 71.1 69.9
OECD 76 77
Germany 93 104.7 92.1 79 81.3 73.6
Australia 78 84 83 79
Canada 85 86.6 87.4 86 82.1 86.3
Spain 74 73.8 73.9 79 71.3 74.2
Finland 82 90.4 83.3 83 77.3 77.9
France 113 107.1 107.4 95 85.4 89.7
Ireland 105 109.4 104.0 102 97.7 96.5
Italy 94 98.5 91.9 88 84.9 82.7
Norway 125 121.1 124.2 98 87.8 92.8
Netherlands 102 106.3 102.2 80 76.2 75.2
United Kingdom 79 86.2 83.7 78 75.3 79.4
Sweden 86 88.9 85.0 80 75 74.7
Korea 42 36.8 59 54
Greece 65 61.8 64.5 73 63.5 69.3
Hungary 50 50.6 52 47.8 48.7
Portugal 53 54.1 52.8 53 49.4 50.4
Poland 35 33.2 40 39.8 37.9
Czech Republic 40 43.9 40.7 46 44.9 44.7
Slovak Republic 40 43.5 44.8 46 45 43.5
Austria 88 100.7 89.5 81 80 75.9
Belgium 108 110.8 106.7 98 93.5 92.5
Denmark 94 101 89.4 80 80.4 75.4
Mexico 30 33 33 36.2
3
Notes: [a] and [d]: PPP 2002; [b] and [e]: 1999 EKS $.; [c] and [f]: PPS. Explanations regarding country groupings in this table
are given in the following section “Labour productivity …”.
1. European Union of 15 countries for Eurostat, 19 countries for OECD.
Sources: [a] and [d]: OECD (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/40/29867116.xls) and Pilat (2004); [b] and [e]: Groningen Growth
and Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, February 2004; [c] and [f]: Eurostat - Structural
indicators database.
• According  to  this,  the  countries  with  the  highest  hourly  labour  productivity  levels  are  in
Europe. In Belgium, France, Ireland and Norway, they appear to be particularly high. This
suggests it is not the United States that is currently setting the “technical frontier” but rather
some European countries.
• Given the comparatively low hourly productivity of some European countries like Spain and
more  particularly  Portugal  and  Greece,  hourly  productivity,  in  the  European  Union  of
15 Member States, would appear to be markedly lower (by some 10 to 20 percentage points)
than the United States average. The gap also appears to be large in the United Kingdom (some
15 to 20 points), Canada (some 15 points) and Japan (25 to 30 points).
At the same time, among the countries with hourly labour productivity levels similar to those of
the United States (with a difference of less than 10 points), the hours worked and employment rates
(except in Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark) are markedly lower than those observed in the
United States (Table 2). The gap is particularly large for hours worked in the Netherlands and, to a
lesser extent, Germany, Belgium and France; and for the employment rate in Italy, Spain and Belgium
and, to a lesser extent, France, Germany and Ireland. We should point out that the lower number of
hours worked may stem from shorter full-time working hours or a higher level of part-time work, or
even from a combination of the two, as is the case in the Netherlands. The lower employment rate may
stem (in quantitative terms) from a lower participation rate or a higher unemployment rate.
Table 2. Hours worked and employment rates, in 2002
Country Average
annual hours
worked
Part-time
employment1
as a % of total
employment
Employment
rate as a % of
population aged
15 – 64 
Labour force
participation
as a % of
population aged
15 – 64 
Unemployment
rate as a % of
labour force
United States 1 800 13.0 71.9 76.4 5.8
European Union (19) 1 619 62.9 69.1 8.9
Euro zone 1 548
Japan 1 798 25.1 68.2 72.3 5.6
OECD 1 739 65.1 69.9 6.9
Germany 1 443 18.8 65.3 71.5 8.6
Australia 1 824 27.5 69.2 73.7 6.1
Canada 1 731 18.7 71.5 77.4 7.7
Spain 1 813 7.6 59.5 67.1 11.4
Finland 1 727 11.0 67.7 74.5 9.1
France 1 437 13.7 62.2 68.3 8.9
Ireland 1 666 18.1 65.0 67.9 4.3
Italy 1 599 11.9 55.6 61.2 9.1
Norway 1 342 20.6 77.1 80.3 4.0
Netherlands 1 338 33.9 73.2 75.6 3.1
United Kingdom 1 692 23.0 72.7 76.6 5.1
Sweden 1 581 13.8 74.9 79.0 5.2
Korea 2 410 7.6 63.3 65.4 3.2
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Greece 1 928 5.6 56.9 63.1 9.8
Hungary 1 766 2.8 56.2 59.7 5.8
Portugal 1 697 9.6 68.1 72.0 5.4
Poland 1 958 11.7 51.7 64.8 20.3
Czech Republic 1 980 2.9 65.7 70.9 7.3
Slovak Republic 1979 1.6 56.9 69.9 18.6
Austria 1 567 13.5 65.8 68.7 4.2
Belgium 1 547 17.2 59.7 64.1 6.9
Denmark 1 462 16.2 76.4 79.9 4.3
Mexico 1 888 13.5 60.1 84.7 2.4
Note: Explanations as to the country groupings in this table are given in the following section “Labour productivity …”.
1. Part-time work here means an average of fewer than 30 hours per week.
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics and Pilat (2004).
Differences  in  hours  worked  and  employment  rates  across  countries  may  affect  relative
productivity levels, as the returns to these two parameters are not constant:
• It is often assumed with regard to hours worked that the effects of fixed costs (which produce
increasing  returns  to  hours  worked),  stemming  for  instance  from  the  inclusion  in  hours
worked of periods of time that are hard to shorten and not directly productive, are outweighed
by the effects of fatigue (which produce diminishing returns). Consequently, returns to hours
worked are assumed to be diminishing in the aggregate.5 The assumption that there are strong
fatigue effects may seem surprising given that the working week is at a fairly historic low in
many industrialised countries. It should be borne in mind that hours worked are given here as
an annual average and that these fatigue effects also include leave and sick-leave effects.
• The assumption of constant returns to the employment rate could be accepted if we assume
that employment-rate differentials are identical across all working-age categories. Yet a close
look at the employment-rate gap between Western Europe and the United States shows that
this  assumption  should  be  categorically  rejected  (see  Table 3).  Breaking  the  working-age
population down by gender and into three age groups (young, adults and older), we see that
the differences in the employment rates are negligible for adult men and women (except for
adult women in Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland) and that they are concentrated in the younger
age group (the employment-rate gap with the United States is at least 20 points in France,
Italy, Greece and Belgium) and the older age group (the gap is at least 20 points in those same
four countries, as well as in Germany, Spain and Austria). The productivity of younger and
older people who are not in employment can be considered to be lower than that of adults in
employment. In the case of younger people, the differential stems from the fact that the more
productive are hired first;  as for older people not  in employment,  it  stems from a loss of
human capital, since older people who are still in their jobs have probably maintained or even
increased their human capital more than those who are no longer in employment. In European
countries, the foreseeable increase in the average employment rate will concern mainly these
two age groups (younger and older people not in employment), which means that returns to
the  employment  rate  will  be  diminishing.6 At  this  point  it  is  important  to  stress  that  the
analysis  of  linkages  between  employment  and  productivity  focuses,  in  this  study,  on  the
productivity of labour-market “outsiders” whereas previous work focused on “insiders”. Use
of the existing literature on this subject is accordingly limited (see above).
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Table 3. Employment rates in 2002 (%)
Country
Population
aged 15 – 64 
Population
aged 15 - 24 Population aged 25 - 54 
Population
aged 55 - 64 
Total Total Total Men Women Total
United States 71.9 55.7 79.3 86.6 72.3 59.5
European Union (19) 62.9 37.4 76.2 85.4 67.0 39.2
Japan 68.2 41.0 78.0 92.0 63.9 61.6
OECD 65.1 43.7 75.5 87.0 64.1 49.4 
Germany 65.3 44.8 78.8 85.6 71.8 38.6
Australia 69.2 59.6 77.1 85.8 68.4 48.2
Canada 71.5 57.3 80.2 85.3 75.2 50.4
Spain 59.5 36.6 70.1 85.8 54.2 39.7
Finland 67.7 39.4 81.6 84.0 79.1 47.8
France 62.2 24.1 79.4 87.4 71.6 39.3
Ireland 65.0 45.3 76.6 87.6 65.6 48.0
Italy 55.6 26.7 70.1 86.0 54.0 28.9
Norway 77.1 56.9 84.4 88.1 80.6 68.4
Netherlands 73.2 66.9 81.9 91.2 72.5 41.8
United Kingdom 72.7 61.0 80.6 87.2 73.8 53.3
Sweden 74.9 46.5 84.2 85.9 82.4 68.3
Korea 63.3 31.5 73.4 88.7 57.7 59.5
Greece 56.9 27.0 71.5 89.0 54.7 39.2
Hungary 56.2 28.5 73.0 79.7 66.5 25.6
Portugal 68.1 41.9 81.5 89.4 74.0 50.9
Poland 51.7 20.0 67.5 73.1 61.9 27.9
Czech Republic 65.7 33.7 82.5 90.2 74.6 40.8
Slovak Republic 56.9 27.2 75.1 79.5 70.6 22.9
Austria 65.8 48.7 80.1 86.8 73.2 27.6
Belgium 59.7 28.5 76.6 86.2 66.8 25.8
Denmark 76.4 64.0 84.7 88.7 80.8 57.3
Mexico 60.1 46.0 68.4 94.5 45.8 53.1
Note: The country groups in this table are explained in the following section “Labour productivity …”.
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics.
Thus, increasing hours worked and employment rates in continental European countries would
lower the comparative level of hourly labour productivity there.  In other words,  the strong hourly
productivity performance of many European countries  compared with the United States cannot be
attributed solely to good causes: their performance is boosted by the fact that average hours worked
are much fewer than in the United States and that employment is heavily concentrated in the most
productive segments of the population. The less productive segments (in this case younger and older
persons or adult women) are voluntarily or involuntarily excluded from employment.
Labour productivity, employment rates and hours worked: an aggregate approach
The variables are defined in the box below and details of sources are given in the Annex. We
shall be looking in turn at the estimated relationship, the results of estimates using the OLS method
and those obtained using instrumental variables.
Estimated relationship
An analysis of the impact on labour productivity of changes in the employment rate and hours
worked  may  initially  be  envisaged  using  econometric  estimates  of  the  following  dynamic
relationship (1), based in part on estimates by Gust and Marquez (2002, 2004) or Bélorgey, Lecat and
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Maury (2004), in which the explained variable (∆ph) corresponds to the rate of change in hourly
labour productivity (PH):
∑
≥
− +++∆+∆+∆+∆=∆
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where:
• The estimates are conducted on relationship (1) in its dynamic or static form (by constraining
a1 = 0). The expected sign of a1 is  a priori uncertain, the sole constraint on this coefficient
being 1a  < 1. If a1 > 0, the long-term effect of a change in the other variables is greater (in
absolute terms) than the short-term effect. For example, an increase in the employment rate
(ER) reduces hourly productivity, but less in the short term than in the long term as firms may
temporarily  offset  the effect  of  hiring less productive people by increasing rates of work.
Conversely, if a1 < 0, the long-term effect of change in the other variables is smaller than the
short-term effect. In the same example, this means that an employment-rate increase reduces
hourly  productivity  more  sharply  in  the  short  term  than  in  the  long  term  as  the  people
concerned gradually close some of their productivity gap, the initial gap being to some extent
caused by a loss of human capital, stemming from the fact that they were previously not in
employment.
• The coefficients a2 and a3 reflect the short-term effects of absolute changes in the employment
rate (∆ER) and the rate of change in hours worked (∆h) on hourly productivity. A priori we
expect: –1 < a2, a3 ≤ 0.
• The  coefficient  a4 reflects  the  effects  of  the  economic  cycle  on  hourly  productivity,  the
position in the cycle being quite simply measured by the capacity utilisation rate (CUR).  A
priori we expect to find: 0 < a4.
• There  are  numerous  other  variables  Xi  that  may  affect  labour  productivity.  Those  whose
effects have been tested here are investment rates (INVR, with an expected coefficient that is
positive), ICT production as a share of GDP (ITPR, positive), ICT spending as a share of GDP
(ITSR, positive), the ICT investment rate (ITIR, positive),7 R&D spending as a share of GDP
(R&DSR, positive), internet users as a share of the population (IUR, positive), the change in
self-employment as a share of total employment (∆SER, uncertain), the change in part-time
employment  as  a  share of  total  employment  (∆PTR, uncertain)8 and the change in public
employment as a share of total employment (∆PER, uncertain). The choice of these variables
was to some extent dictated by previous studies, such as those by Gust and Marquez (2002,
2004)  and  Belorgey,  Lecat  and  Maury  (2004)  which  focus  on  the  impact  of  ICT  on
productivity. Both studies show that the acceleration in productivity in the United States in the
second half of the 1990s was in part due to the size of the ICT producing sector and to the
widespread  diffusion  of  ICTs  there.  As  this  is  a  first-difference  study,  many  of  the
determinants of productivity that are very stable in every country over the period concerned
(e.g. human capital) have not been used. For the same reason, the impact of missing level
variables has not been captured by the fixed effects tested for, as they are not significant in
any of the 14 countries that were eventually selected. 
The specification represented by relationship (1) is obviously very simplistic. In particular, the
dynamic effects are represented by the mere presence of an autoregressive term and are therefore
assumed to be identical for all of the relevant explanatory variables. Furthermore, the effects of each
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explanatory variable on productivity are assumed to be the same, regardless of the variable’s actual
level, which is also a powerful simplifying assumption. The assumption regarding non-linear effects is
quite plausible as an economic reality. So the results of the estimates set out below should be viewed
with the utmost caution: while the direction of the effects addressed here can be viewed as robust, their
magnitude is bound to be very imprecise.
The estimates are based on annual data for the period 1992-2002 across a panel of 25 OECD
countries, as listed in the box below. We have opted for a short estimation period (11 years) but the
information required for our final choice of estimates was not always available over a longer period.
Box: Variables used in the study
The definitions and sources of these variables are given in the annex.
• PH: Hourly labour productivity;
• N: Total employment;
• POP: Working-age population;
• ER: Employment rate;
• ERCj: Employment-rate contribution of category j. ERCj = Nj / POP;
• jERC : Employment-rate contribution of categories other than category j. jERC = ER - ERCj;
• SER: Self-employment as a share of total employment;
• PER: Public employment as a share of total employment;
• H: Average annual hours worked;
• PTR: Part-time employment as a share of total employment;
• CUR: Capacity utilisation rate, a variable centred and normed for each country using the average and
standard deviation observed in France;
• INVR: Investment spending as a share of GDP (investment rate);
• ITPR: ICT production as a share of GDP;
• ITSR: ICT spending as a share of GDP;
• ITIR: ICT investment as a share of GDP (ICT investment rate);
• R&DSR: R&D spending as a share of GDP;
• IUR: Internet users as a share of the population;
• Q: Volume GDP;
• P: Consumer price index;
• Subscript -1 indicates that the variable is lagged by one period;
• Subscript j indicates that the variable refers to category j;
• ∆ before a variable means a difference of the first order;
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• o above a variable gives its year-on-year growth rate;
• ^ above a coefficient gives its estimated value;
• Variables in lower case correspond to their logs.
List of the 25 OECD countries serving as a basis for this empirical study:
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
List of 21 countries:
The previous list of 25 countries, excluding Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Mexico.
List of 14 countries:
The previous list of 21 countries, excluding the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Portugal
and the Slovak Republic.
Estimation results using the OLS method
The estimates of dynamic relationship (1) (a1 ≠ 0) or static relationship (1) (a1 = 0) obtained using
the ordinary least squares method (OLS) produce the following results (see Table 4):
Table 4. Estimation results for relationship (1)
OLS – Estimation period: 1992-2001
A. Estimate of static relationship 1 (a1 = 0)
Explanatory
variables 
25
countries 
[1]
21
countries
[2]
14
countries
[3]
14
countries
[4]
14
countries
[5]
14
countries
[6]
14
countries
[7]
14
countries
[8]
14
countries
[9]
14
countries
[10]
∆ER -0.212
(0.044)
-0.196
(0.043)
-0.203
(0.039)
-0.191
(0.039)
-0.203
(0.039)
-0.196
(0.040)
-0.219
(0.040)
-0.219
(0.044)
-0.204
(0.040)
-0.200
(0.048)
∆h -0.721
(0.085)
-0.551
(0.095)
-0.583
(0.118)
-0.645
(0.119)
-0.559
(0.118)
-0.578
(0.119)
-0.572
(0.118)
-0.573
(0.119)
-0.587
(0.123)
-0.581
(0.119)
∆CUR 0.150
(0.025)
0.114
(0.027)
0.086
(0.024)
0.079
(0.023)
0.083
(0.024)
0.081
(0.024)
0.080
(0.024)
0.089
(0.024)
0.086
(0.024)
0.086
(0.024)
INVR -0.038
(0.015)
ITPR 0.100
(0.030)
0.079
(0.029)
0.166
(0.029)
0.160
(0.029)
0.185
(0.030)
0.171
(0.030)
0.178
(0.030)
0.165
(0.029)
0.166
(0.029)
0.166
(0.029)
ITSR -0.059
(0.030)
IUR -0.003
(0.003)
R&DSR -0.136
(0.064)
∆SER -0.094
(0.124)
∆PTR -0.012
(0.078)
∆PER 0.015
(0.128)
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Cte 0.005
(0.005)
0.006
(0.002)
ε
(0.001)
0.008
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
Adjusted R² 0.308 0.214 0.341 0.366 0.355 0.340 0.351 0.339 0.336 0.336
B. Estimate of dynamic relationship 1 (a1 ≠ 0)
Explanatory
variables 
25
countries
[1]
21
countries
[2]
14
countries
[3]
14
countries
[4]
14
countries
[5]
14
countries
[6]
14
countries
[7]
14
countries
[8]
14
countries
[9]
14
countries
[10]
∆ph-1 0.181
(0.053)
0.234
(0.058)
0.116
(0.074)
0.086
(0.074)
0.095
(0.074)
0.110
(0.074)
0.108
(0.075)
0.116
(0.074)
0.117
(0.074)
0.116
(0.074)
∆ER -0.185
(0.044)
-0.169
(0.042)
-0.198
(0.039)
-0.188
(0.039)
-0.199
(0.039)
-0.192
(0.040)
-0.212
(0.040)
-0.214
(0.044)
-0.200
(0.040)
-0.193
(0.048)
∆h -0.745
(0.084)
-0.563
(0.092)
-0.567
(0.118)
-0.628
(0.119)
-0.548
(0.118)
-0.564
(0.118)
-0.556
(0.118)
-0.557
(0.119)
-0.574
(0.122)
-0.566
(0.119)
∆CUR 0.158
(0.025)
0.115
(0.026)
0.085
(0.024)
0.079
(0.023)
0.082
(0.023)
0.080
(0.024)
0.079
(0.024)
0.087
(0.024)
0.085
(0.024)
0.085
(0.024)
INVR -0.034
(0.015)
ITPR 0.079
(0.031)
0.064
(0.029)
0.147
(0.032)
0.169
(0.033)
0.155
(0.032)
0.161
(0.032)
0.148
(0.031)
0.150
(0.031)
0.149
(0.031)
ITSR -0.053
(0.030)
IUR -0.002
(0.003)
R&DSR -0.126
(0.064)
∆SER -0.094
(0.123)
∆PTR -0.019
(0.078)
∆PER 0.025
(0.128)
Cte 0.004
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
0.007
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
-ε
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
ε
(0.002)
Adjusted R² 0.339 0.272 0.348 0.368 0.358 0.346 0.356 0.346 0.343 0.343
Notes: The numbers in brackets below the coefficients are standard deviations. For details of the lists of 25, 21 and
14 countries, see box.
• The estimated values of some coefficients are not stable to the list of countries. For instance, i) the
coefficient for the rate of change in hours worked (∆h) is strongly impacted by the inclusion of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Mexico on the list of countries (differences between columns [1]
and [2] in Tables 4A and B);  ii) the coefficients for changes in the capacity utilisation rate (∆
CUR), ICT production as a share of GDP (ITPR) and the autoregressive term (∆ph-1) are strongly
impacted by the inclusion of the same four countries (differences between columns [1] and [2] in
Tables 4A and B) plus the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Poland, Portugal and the
Slovak Republic on the list (differences between columns [2] and [3] Tables 4A and B). Both of
these country groups are fairly specific: the first group of four countries comprises three small
European countries for which some of the data used have occasionally had to be reconstituted,
plus another  country,  Mexico,  for  which the  available data are still  somewhat  imprecise;  the
second group comprises countries in Asia and Southern or Eastern Europe which are still trying to
catch up with the more advanced industrialised countries.  As these estimated  coefficients  are
unstable to the list of countries, the emphasis is placed on analysing the results for the 14 most
industrialised countries, none of which are shown by the estimates to have a marked impact on the
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results.  Moreover, for this same group of 14 countries,  the estimates  also appear to be robust
when one or two years of observation are withdrawn.
• The coefficients of the variables for investment rates (INVR), ICT spending as a share of
GDP (ITSR), the internet user ratio (IUR) and R&D spending as a share of GDP (R&DSR)
carry the opposite sign to the one expected and are usually not significantly different from
zero. Furthermore, the coefficients of the variables for changes in the rate of self-employment
(∆SER), part-time employment (∆PTR) and public employment (∆PER) are not significant in
any of the estimates. Consequently, these variables will not feature on the list of explanatory
variables. The study therefore focuses on the estimates whose results are set out in column [3]
of Tables 4A and B.
• The estimation results of the static and dynamic relationships are consistent with regard to
long-term effects. According to the dynamic formulation (Table 4B, column [3]), it emerges
that i) a one-point change in the employment rate has an inverse effect on hourly productivity
of 0.20% in the short term (the same year) and 0.22% in the long term;  ii) a 1% change in
hours worked has an inverse effect on hourly productivity of 0.57% in the short term and
0.64% in the long term; iii) a one-point change in the utilisation rate has a parallel effect on
hourly productivity of 0.09% in the short term and 0.10% in the long term;  iv) a one-point
change  in  ICT  production  as  a  share  of  GDP  has  a  parallel  effect  on  growth  in  hourly
productivity of 0.15% in the short term and 0.17% in the long term.
The results obtained can be compared with the only two previous studies proposing estimates of
identical or similar relationships:
• Gust and Marquez (2002, 2004), using OLS or GLS on the private sector alone over the
period 1993-2000, have estimated a relationship very similar to static relationship (1) on a
panel of 13 countries (plus Ireland in our own panel of 14 countries) over the 1990s.9 They
do not take into account the effect of change in hours worked, and the measurement of the
position in the cycle is an OECD estimation of the GDP differential, where the coefficient is
not significant. ICT production as a share of GDP and ICT spending as a share of GDP are,
along with changes in the employment rate, explanatory variables whose coefficients are
significant  and have the expected signs.  The effect  of a change in the employment  rate,
measured by the employed share of the 15-and-over age group, is 3.5 to 4 times stronger
than  the  one  estimated  here  for  the  change  in  the  employment  rate  measured  by  the
employed share of the 15-64 age group. There are many possible reasons for the differential,
including a difference in coverage (private economy or economy as a whole), a difference in
the definition of the relevant variable (employment rate in the 15-and-over age group or the
15-64 age  group),  or  a  difference  in  the  panel  (presence  or  absence  of  Ireland,  period
covered).10
• Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) also propose an estimate of a very similar relationship,
using  the  GMM  (Generalised  Method  of  Moments)  or  OLS  techniques,  on  a  panel  of
25 countries or the same 13 countries as in the previous study, over the period 1992-2000.11
The explanatory variables for changes in productivity are variations in the employment rate,
hours worked, the capacity utilisation rate and the level of ICT production and spending as a
share of GDP. Changes in the utilisation rate always affect changes in productivity, with a
coefficient  very  similar  to  the  one  estimated  here  (0.1% of  productivity  for  a  one-point
variation in the utilisation rate). ICT production and spending as shares of GDP have a joint
effect on changes in productivity, but the production effect alone is specifically significant, as
in  our  measurement.  Finally,  a  1% increase  in  hours  worked  or  in  the  employment  rate
11
reduces hourly productivity by some 0.65% and 0.3%, respectively, for the 25-country panel
and by 0.8% and 0.4% for the 13-country panel. These results are similar to ours, given the
differences in the samples.
Estimation results using the instrumental-variables method
The estimation results presented above may be subject to simultaneity bias. To correct for this,
the study continues using instrumental variables. Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) used GMM, but
their estimates were based on 25 countries, including those that have just been shown to have a strong
impact on estimation outcomes. The focus of this study is confined to 14 countries, a sample too small
to envisage using GMM.
Three tests are used to assess adjustment quality: the Nelson and Startz test (1990a and 1990b)
and the Sargan test (1958), which tell us about the overall quality of the adjustment and the overall
relevance of the instruments, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman,
1978) to ensure that the instruments are exogenous.
As with estimates using the OLS method, the variable coefficients for investment rates (INVR),
ICT spending rate (ITSR), R&D spending (R&DSR), changes in the rate of self-employment (∆SER),
part-time employment (∆PTR) and public employment (∆PER) always showed an implausible order of
magnitude, and all of these variables were eventually removed from the list of explanatory variables.
We also conducted a more in-depth analysis of the impact of ICT investment as a share of GDP (ITIR)
and its findings are set out and discussed below. The instrumentation of explanatory variables is aimed
at correcting for two types of specification bias in the estimates: bias stemming from certain errors of
measurement that are inevitable with the variables used and bias caused by simultaneity between those
same  variables.  Many  ranges  of  instruments  were  tested  for  relevance.  The  most  satisfactory
(column [8] in Table 5), namely the one that produces plausible results and is validated by all three
tests,  is  obtained  for  relationship (1)  estimated  as  dynamic  (a1 ≠ 0),  does  not  instrument  the
autoregressive term (∆ph)-1, change in hours worked (∆h) or change in the capacity utilisation rate (∆
CUR) and opts to use as instruments for the other variables the second difference of the explained
variable (∆2(∆ph)), present (∆q) and lagged variations (∆q-1) in output, the lagged variation in the
employment rate (∆ER-2) and the investment rate (INVR). This is because there is evidence that using
variations in hours worked or the capacity utilisation rate, in a static (a1 = 0) or dynamic (a1 ≠ 0) form
of relationship (1), always produces less satisfactory results (columns [1] to [7] of Table 5).
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Table 5. Estimation result for relationship (1)
Instrumental variables method – period: 1992-2001
Explanatory variables 
14 countries 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
∆ph-1 -0.379
(0.280)
-0.530
(0.320)
-0.296
(0.184)
-0.393
(0.210)
∆ER -0.583
(0.177)
-0.653
(0.239)
-0.701
(0.216)
-0.844
(0.289)
-0.675
(0.194)
-0.538
(0.150)
-0.789
(0.234)
-0.635
(0.170)
∆h -0.465
(0.583)
-0.209
(0.738)
0.419
(0.687)
0.655
(0.893)
-0.685
(0.260)
-0.726
(0.221)
-0.463
(0.281)
-0.531
(0.239)
∆CUR 0.225
(0.086)
0.203
(0.105)
0.065
(0.061)
0.065
(0.077)
-0.261
(0.082)
0.249
(0.070)
0.114
(0.056)
0.113
(0.048)
ITPR 0.606
(0.192)
0.769
(0.301)
0.793
(0.227)
1.049
(0.350)
0.697
(0.194)
0.611
(0.175)
0.844
(0.231)
0.758
(0.192)
Cste -0.022
(0.009)
-0.027
(0.013)
0.030
(0.011)
-0.038
(0.015)
-0.027
(0.010)
-0.020
(0.008)
-0.034
(0.012)
-0.026
(0.008)
Sargan test
Statistic 3.556 2.734 6.175 2.137 0.958 4.760 4.176 7.921
P-value 0.314 0.434 0.103 0.544 0.811 0.190 0.243 0.047
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
Statistic 73.141 73.019 52.358 66.844 80.704 70.092 1.150 51.975
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nelson & Startz test
R²*n
Threshold: 2
44.744 11.2312 11.9957 105.737 18.543 51.291 23.199 21.406
Notes: The numbers in brackets beneath the coefficients are their standard deviation. Lists of the 25, 21 and 14 countries are
given in the box.
List of instruments:
[1]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆h-1; ∆CUR-1; INVR;
[2]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆h-1; ∆CUR-1 ; INVR; (∆ph)-1;
[3]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆h-1; INVR; ∆CUR;
[4]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆h-1 ; INVR; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1;
[5]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆CUR-1; INVR; ∆h;
[6]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; ∆CUR-1 ; INVR; ∆h; (∆ph)-1;
[7]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR;
[8]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1.
The use of instrument ∆2(∆ph) was questionable on the grounds of simultaneity. It was therefore replaced in supplementary
estimates by the same variable lagged by one period. However, this change of instrument reduces the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
statistic and produces long-term coefficients that are very similar to those given above. The results of these alternative
estimates can be obtained from the authors on request.
The results thus obtained tell us that (column [8] of Table 5):
1. The use of instrumental variables substantially alters the impact of the autoregressive term.
This is because, owing to the autoregressive nature of relationship (1), the OLS estimator is
theoretically non-convergent (if  the residuals do not all have the right homoscedasticity),
unlike  the  instrumental  variables  estimator.  Moreover,  as  the  autoregressive  term,  by
construction, has the most simultaneity with the other variables concerned, it is the most
sensitive to the corrections for bias made by instrumental variables.
2. The  long-term  coefficients  here  would  be  smaller  than  the  short-term  ones,  as  the
autoregressive term has a negative sign. Again, in the case of change in the employment rate
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or hours worked, this means that there is a learning effect. This is particularly satisfying with
regard to the effects of changes in the employment rate. For instance, while people who are
of  working  age  but  not  in  work  are  markedly  less  productive  than  those  in  work,  the
transition  to  employment  enables  them  gradually  to  increase  their  human  capital  and
approach (but not attain) the productivity level of people in employment.
3. It emerges that in the long term,  i) a one-point variation in the employment rate changes
hourly  productivity  by  -0.46% (compared  with  a  short-term effect  of  -0.64%);  ii) a  1%
variation in hours worked changes hourly productivity by -0.38% (-0.53%); iii) a one-point
change in the utilisation rate raises hourly productivity by 0.08% (0.11%);  iv) a one-point
change in ICT production as a share of GDP raises the growth in hourly productivity by
0.54% (0.76%). These long-term effects differ fairly markedly from those estimated using
the OLS method, as described above. However, they are very similar to those estimated by
Belorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) using GMM on a panel of 25 countries, which indicate
that  in  the  long  term:  i) a  one-point  variation  in  the  employment  rate  changes  hourly
productivity by –0.50% and ii) a 1% variation in hours worked changes hourly productivity
by –0.36%.12 But there is quite a difference in the short-term effects of both these variables
and in short and long-term effects of changes in the utilisation rate or ICT production as a
share of GDP, which are not used in the remainder of this study.
Some studies,  such as that  of  Gust  and Marquez (2002,  2004),  have managed to identify  an
impact  on productivity  from ICT production  but  also  an (only  just  significant)  impact  from ICT
spending. Yet the influence of ICT spending as a share of GDP is not significant in the estimates
described above. An interesting way of refining the analysis is to test the hypothesis of an impact of
ICT investment spending alone as a share of GDP (ITIR). The results of the estimates are given in
Table 6.
Table 6. Estimation results for relationship (1)
Impact of the ICT investment rate on productivity
Using the instrumental-variables method - Period: 1992-2001
Explanatory variables 
14
countries
13 countries (list of 14 minus Norway)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
∆ph-1 -0.393
(0.210)
-0.411
(0.161)
0.235
(0.107)
-0.402
(0.146)
-0.385
(0.189)
∆ER -0.635
(0.170)
-0.556
(0.117)
-0.164
(0.089)
-0.492
(0.097)
-0.583
(0.139)
∆h -0.531
(0.239)
-0.526
(0.175)
-0.879
(0.249)
-0.377
(0.162)
-0.654
(0.279)
∆CUR 0.113
(0.048)
0.108
(0.036)
0.130
(0.046)
0.082
(0.032)
0.127
(0.051)
ITPR 0.758
(0.192)
0.620
(0.122)
0.604
(0.110)
0.599
(0.143)
ITIR 0.007
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.001)
0.003
(0.004)
Cste -0.026
(0.008)
-0.020
(0.005)
-0.012
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.004)
-0.027
(0.012)
Sargan test
Statistic 7.921 17.703 37.177 25.641 13.145
P-value 0.047 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
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Statistic 51.975 33.807 15.918 26.481 33.605
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nelson & Startz test
R²*n
Threshold: 2
21.406 71.659 67.067 84.108 54.180
Notes: The numbers in brackets beneath the coefficients are standard deviations. The lists of the 25, 21 and 14 countries are
given in the box.
List of instruments:
[1]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1.;
[2]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1;
[3]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1;
[4]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1; ITIR;
[5]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; ∆ER-2; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ph)-1.
The ICT investment rate variable (ITIR) is only available for 13 of the 14 countries on the above
list of countries, as the information is not available for Norway. To obtain a basis for comparison,
therefore, we decided to repeat the most relevant of the previous estimates (column [8] of Table 5
repeated  in  column [1]  of  Table 6)  using  the  smaller  panel  (column [2]  of  Table 6),  leaving  the
remaining list of instruments unchanged. The outcome shows that the results with this smaller list of
13 countries do not differ markedly from those obtained earlier with the 14-country list (comparison of
columns [1] and [2] of Table 6). The replacement, in the list of variables, of the ICT production rate
(ITPR)  by  the  ICT  investment  variable  (ITIR)  then  destabilises  all  of  the  estimation  results
(column [3] of Table 6). In particular, the long-term elasticity of hourly productivity to hours worked
falls to below -1, which is not economically plausible. Furthermore, while the sign is indeed positive
as  expected,  the  ICT  investment  rate  coefficient  is  not  significant.  If  the  variables  for  the  ICT
production  rate  (ITPR)  and  the  ICT  investment  rate  (ITIR)  are  both  present  simultaneously,  the
coefficients for all of the variables other than the ICT investment rate (ITIR) are very similar to those
estimated  without  the  ICT  investment  rate  variable  (comparison  of  columns [4]  and  [5]  with
column [2]  of  Table 6).  Furthermore,  these  two  regressions  prompt  acceptance  of  the  significant
impact  of  ICT  production  and  rejection  of  that  of  ICT  investment.  Thus,  when  ITIR  is  not
instrumented  (column [4]  of  Table 6),  the  sign  for  the  coefficient  of  this  variable  appears  to  be
implausible, which may stem from errors of measurement or simultaneity bias. Once this specification
bias has been corrected by instrumenting the ICT investment rate (ITIR), the coefficient estimated for
this variable is not significant (column [5] of Table 6).
These results confirm that the impact of ICT on productivity is clearer on our panel of countries
with the presence of an explanatory variable giving the ICT production rate than with variables giving
the ICT spending rate, even if that spending is for investment purposes. 
Approach based on a breakdown of the working-age population
The results set out in Table 5 above confirm the idea that differences in employment rates and
hours  worked  across  the  more  advanced  industrialised  countries  influence  their  comparative
productivity. The effects of the employment rate on productivity have up to this point been addressed
in  the  aggregate.  It  has  been demonstrated  above,  however,  that  differences  in  employment  rates
concern different population groups, depending on the country. We should therefore look at the impact
of  an increase  in the employment  rate  for each segment  of the working-age population and each
gender.
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Methodology
Here we have opted to break the working-age population down into six separate categories by
gender and age group (15-24, 25-54 and 55-64 years). The aim is to analyse the effect of a change in
the aggregate employment rate caused by a change in the employment rate of each of these categories.
Consequently  the  explanatory  variables  used  here  are  the  contributions  of  each  category  to  the
aggregate employment rate (rather than the employment rates of each category). These contributions,
represented as ERCj, are equal to Nj/POP where Nj is the number of employees in category j and POP
the working-age population. This breakdown facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients,
with the coefficient of ∆ERCj corresponding to the effect on productivity of a one-point change in the
aggregate  employment  rate  stemming  from  a  change  in  the  employment  rate  of  working-age
category j. It also provides some interesting additivity, since the effect of an increase in the aggregate
employment rate can be approximated by calculating the weighted sum of the coefficients for each
contribution.13 This  additivity  makes  it  possible  to  check  the  model’s  specification  by looking  at
whether this weighted sum is equal to the short-term coefficient attached to the aggregate employment
rate, i.e. -0.635 (see Table 5, column [8]).
Estimating the model  described in the first  section but distinguishing the six contributions to
changes in the aggregate employment rate produces implausible results, as some coefficients do not
have the expected sign or are of an implausible order of magnitude. It therefore proved necessary to
constrain the coefficients of the other variables in the estimate of relationship (1) to their previously
estimated  values  (Table 5,  column [8]).  Estimates  were  thus  carried  out  on  each  category  of  the
working-age population based on the relationship:
∑
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where:
ERCj is the contribution of category j to the employment rate and jERC  is the sum of the contributions
to the employment rate of all the other categories combined. Coefficients âi are the estimated values of
the coefficients corresponding to relationship (1), set out in Table 5, column [8].
Relationship (2)  was  estimated  using  the  instrumental-variables  method,  so  as  to  correct  for
simultaneity effects. Three considerations guided the search for the right specification:
1. Regarding the estimate for each category j, the recalculated aggregate coefficient had to be
consistent  with  the  one  estimated  directly  at  the  aggregate  level  in  the  previous  section
(-0.635).
2. Regarding  the  six  estimates  combined,  the  recalculated  aggregate  coefficient  had  to  be
consistent  with  the  one  estimated  directly  at  the  aggregate  level  in  the  previous  section
(-0.635).
3. The range of instruments used for each of the six estimates had to be relatively stable. We
therefore began by using the same instruments as for the aggregate estimate. Subsequently,
the only variables added to the initial range were those relating to employment.
The  methodology  used  here  is  a  simple  quantitative  breakdown  of  the  short-term  effect  on
productivity of changes in the aggregate employment rate estimated above (-0.635). This is why it is
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crucial that the estimates relating to each of the six relevant categories be consistent with the aggregate
estimate. 
Employment-rate effects by age group and gender
Estimating relationship (2) on the basis of the three considerations above produces the results set
out in Table 7.
For the estimate regarding women aged 55 to 64, a dummy variable had to be added for Spain.
There, that particular category of the working-age population is characterised by an atypically low
employment rate (20.1% in 2000) compared with other countries (37.1% across the OECD area).
Table 7. Estimation results for relationship (2)
Instrumental variables method – Period: 1992-2001
Explanatory variables
Men aged
15-24 
Women
aged
15-24 
Men aged
24-55 
Women
aged
25-54 
Men aged
55-64 
Women
aged
55-64
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ERj -0.893 -0.898 -0.488 -0.486 -0.889 -0.920
∆ jER -0.550 -0.575 -0.679 -0.706 -0.621 -0.622
DSpain 0.008
Constant -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027
Effect of recalculated ∆TE
on the regression
-0.609 -0.602 -0.615 -0.635 -0.636 -0.630
Non-centred R² 0.882 0.881 0.882 0.879 0.880 0.885
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
Statistic 19.412 21.686 19.753 25.609 18.130 17.208
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nelson & Startz test
R²*n
Threshold: 2
122.542 122.445 122.570 122.250 122.376 123.071
Notes: List of instruments: 
[1]: ∆2(∆ph); (∆ph)-1; ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ERCj)-2; (∆ERCsex)-2; (∆ERCâge)-2; ∆PTR; ∆PTR-1; ∆SER; ∆SER-1;
[2]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ERCj)-1; (∆ERCsex)-1; (∆ERCâge)-1; ∆PTR-1; ∆SER-1;
[3]: ∆2(∆ph); (∆ph)-1; ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ERCj)-1; (∆ jER )-1; ∆PTR-1; ∆PTR;
[4]: ∆2(∆ph); (∆ph)-1; ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; ∆h; ∆CUR; (∆ERCj)-2; (∆ERCsex)-1; (∆ERCâge)-1; ∆PTR; ∆PTR-1.;
[5]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; (∆ERCj)-1; (∆ERCsex)-2; ∆ERCâge; ∆PTR; ∆PTR-1; ∆SER-1;
[6]: ∆2(∆ph); ∆q; ∆q-1; INVR; ∆CUR; (∆ERCj)-1; (∆ERCsex)-2; ∆ERCâge; ∆PTR-1; ∆SER-1; dSpain;
where: ERCsex is the employment-rate contribution of people of the same gender as those in the relevant category, and 
ERCâge the employment-rate contribution of those of the same age as those in the relevant category.
Each of these six estimates produces a recalculated aggregate employment-rate effect that is very
similar to the one estimated previously from relationship (1). Furthermore, the Nelson and Startz and
Durbin-Wu-Hausman  tests  indicate  that  for  each  estimate,  the  instruments  used  appear  to  be
exogenous and to correct the simultaneity bias appropriately.
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Comparative effects on productivity of employment-rate changes in each category
The  short-term  effects  on  labour  productivity  of  a  one-point  variation  in  the  aggregate
employment rate caused by a change in the employment rate in one of the six categories of persons
concerned are obtained directly from the estimates of relationship (2) set out in Table 7. From these
coefficients we can calculate, as described above, the same short-term effects on aggregates by gender
or age or on all those of working age. Finally, we can associate with each of these short-term effects a
long-term effect based on an estimate of the autoregressive term in dynamic relationship (1).14 All of
these effects  are set  out  in Table 8.  The method used to calculate the aggregate effect  on several
categories is  not strictly speaking an arithmetical  average (see note 13).  So the value of the semi-
elasticity recalculated for aggregate categories is not necessarily included in the interval defined by the
semi-elasticities of the various categories concerned.
Table 8. Effects on labour productivity of a one-point change in the employment rate induced by a change
in the employment rates of various working-age categories
For each category of the working-age population, the first line gives the short-term effect and the second line the
long-term effect.
15 to 24 25 to 54 55 to 64 Aggregate
Women -0.898
-0.645
-0.486
-0.349
-0.920
-0.660
-0.790
-0.567
Men -0.893
-0.641
-0.488
-0.350
-0.889
-0.638
-0.683
-0.490
Aggregate -0.895
-0.642
-0.487
-0.350
-0.900
-0.646
-0.626
-0.449
Notes: For the reason given in the study, the value of the semi-elasticity recalculated for aggregate categories is not necessarily
included in the interval defined by the semi-elasticities of the various categories concerned.
Interpretation: A one-point increase in the aggregate employment rate induced by an increase in the employment rate of
women aged 15 to 24 would bring down hourly labour productivity by 0.898% in the short term (the same year) and 0.645% in
the long term.
For the reasons described above, the effects set out in Table 8 for one category of the working-
age population cannot be directly  interpreted as  information on the productivity  of that  particular
category, in respect of either those in the category who are employed or all those of working age.
Regarding  such  effects,  the  differences  between  categories  should  not  be  directly  interpreted  as
productivity gaps between the two categories but rather as productivity gaps between people in each
category who are  currently  not  employed but  would be the first  to move into employment.  Such
comparisons  require  caution  since  the  effects  are  an  average  for  all  14 countries  and  may  mask
differences between countries that stem from salient features such as the employment rates in each
category. This is because the actual impact of a change in a particular category’s contribution to the
aggregate employment rate is likely to vary from one country to another, depending on the initial level
of the employment rate in that category.
The  productivity  effects  of  a  variation  in  the  aggregate  employment  rate  stemming  from  a
variation in the employment rate of working-age people in the younger age group (15 to 24) and older
age group (55 to 64) are markedly greater than for those in the middle age group (25 to 54). Yet we
saw  above  that  employment-rate  differentials  between  the  larger  industrialised  countries  and  in
particular vis-à-vis the United States concern mainly younger and older members of the working-age
population. This means that differences in employment rates can heavily impact on relative levels of
hourly productivity. In particular, they can contribute to a marked increase in the hourly productivity
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of many countries  vis-à-vis the United States. Furthermore, owing to structure effects (as the semi-
elasticities are similar for men and women in each of the three age groups), the productivity effects of
a variation in the aggregate employment rate  stemming from a change in the employment  rate of
women are slightly greater than for men.
The effects of an increase in the employment rate in the 15-24 age group may look substantial: a
one-point rise in the employment rate stemming from an increase in the employment rate of younger
people would bring about a long-term decrease of 0.64% in hourly labour productivity. This calls for
two  comments:  i) first,  some  of  the  young  people  concerned  may  be  underachievers  and  their
productivity may actually be markedly lower than average for those in employment; ii) any person in
this category eventually moves into the higher age group (25 to 54) where productivity is similar or
identical to that of the average person in employment. This individual dynamic dimension certainly
puts into perspective the scope of any estimated effects on productivity that may be produced by an
increase  in  the  employment  rate  of  the  younger  age  group.  The  effects  of  an  increase  in  the
employment  rate  in  the  55-64  age  group  may  also  look  substantial.  Again,  this  calls  for  three
comments, which may help to explain the importance of this effect: i) some members of this age group
have worked little if at all and so have little work experience; ii) others have failed to maintain their
human capital and may have accordingly lost their jobs;  iii) some of those aged 55 to 64 who enter
employment (or re-enter after a period of non-employment) are not going to make a genuine effort to
develop their human capital, given their fast-approaching retirement.
From observed productivity to structural productivity
To calculate “structural” productivity compared with the United States, the long-term coefficients
of hours worked and the employment rate were applied to the differences (vis-à-vis the United States)
“observed” for both of these variables. In this approach, it is assumed that the effects estimated above
of annual changes in each variable in each country can be transposed so as to gauge the effects of what
may be large differences for the same variables across countries, which is again a highly simplifying
assumption. The following calculations should therefore be viewed with the utmost caution.
An  initial  measurement  of  the  effects  of  employment-rate  differences  can  be  obtained  from
estimates at the aggregate level (see Table 5, column 8). A second measurement is based on estimates
for each of the six categories of the working-age population (Table 7). This disaggregate measurement
also produces a structure effect for the working-age population.15
The results obtained using these different approaches are set out in Table 9.
Table 9. Effects of employment-rate differences with the United States on the relative level of hourly
labour productivity in 2002
In % points of hourly productivity in the United States
Aggregate
approach
Approach based on categories of the working-age population
Men
aged
15-24 
Women
aged
15-24 
Men
aged
24-55 
Women
age
25-54 
Men
aged
55-64 
Women
aged
55-64 
Total
employ-
ment rate
effects
Structure
effect Total
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h] [i] [j]
Germany -3.0 -1.1 -1.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -3.6 0.7 -2.9
Australia -1.2 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -0.8 -1.0 0.4 -0.6
Canada -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Spain -5.7 -1.0 -1.6 0.2 -2.3 -0.2 -1.5 -6.3 -0.1 -6.4
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United
States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finland -1.9 -1.2 -1.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -2.5 0.8 -1.7
France -4.5 -1.8 -2.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 -5.9 0.5 -5.4
Ireland -3.2 0.4 0.0 -0.5 -1.5 -0.2 -1.3 -2.9 1.2 -1.7
Italy -7.4 -1.8 -2.2 0.1 -2.4 -0.7 -1.6 -8.6 0.2 -8.3
Japan -1.7 -1.1 -1.0 0.3 -1.6 1.7 0.5 -1.3 1.0 -0.3
Norway 2.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 2.4 0.0 2.4
Netherlands 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.2
United
Kingdom 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4
Sweden 1.4 -1.1 -0.9 -0.1 0.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.6 2.2
Notes: [h] = [b] + [c] + [d] + [e] + [f] + [g] and [j] = [h] + [i]. Details of how these effects were calculated are given in the study.
Interpretation: If France had the same employment rates as the United States, hourly labour productivity would be 4.5% lower
using the aggregate approach and 5.3% lower using the approach based on working-age categories, as the effect is broken
down into a negative effect of 5.9% for employment-rate effects alone and a positive effect of 0.5% for the structure effect.
The effects obtained here using the aggregate approach are often smaller than those measured by
Cette (2004, 2005),  owing to the semi-elasticity  of productivity  to the lowest  employment  rate in
absolute terms. Again, the elasticity selected here appears more robust to the list of countries in the
sample.
In four countries the employment-rate difference with the United States is found to lower hourly
productivity,  namely  the Netherlands  using the  aggregate  approach and Norway,  Sweden and the
United Kingdom using both approaches. In these four countries, the aggregate employment rate is
higher than in the United States. Everywhere else, employment-rate gaps increase hourly productivity,
sometimes  substantially  (over  5%)  as  in  France,  Italy  and  Spain.  The  approach  based  on
disaggregation into working-age categories produces effects that are in some cases markedly different
to those produced using the aggregate approach. This is particularly the case in Ireland and Japan
(where  the  difference  between  the  two  approaches  exceeds  one  point).  For  countries  where  the
differences in the employment rate with the United States are particularly concentrated on the young
and old, which display the lowest estimated semi-elasticities of productivity to the employment rate,
the  disaggregate  approach  gives  rise  to  a  greater  productivity  effect  for  this  difference  than  the
aggregate approach. Examples include France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
With this full set of estimation results, we can roughly measure the “structural” level of hourly
productivity for each country compared with the United States. This is the relative level of “structural”
hourly  productivity that  would be observed,  given the assumptions made,  if  each country’s hours
worked and employment rates (for each working-age category) were the same as in the United States.
This calculation, the results of which are set out in Table 10, takes into account the diminishing return
effects of hours worked and employment rates, based on the elasticities mentioned above, selecting the
measurements obtained with the disaggregate approach for the employment-rate effect. The insight
gained from this is similar to that derived from the previous, less detailed study by Cette (2004, 2005).
Table 10. “Observed” and “structural” hourly productivity in 2002
As% of United States 
“Observed” hourly productivity Effect of differences… “Structural” hourly productivity
OECD
Groningen
Eurostat … in
hours
worked
… in the
employ-
ment rate 
OECD Groningen Eurostat
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[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] =[a]+[d]+[e]
[g] =
[b]+[d]+[e]
[h] =
[c]+[d]+[e]
Germany 93 104.7 92.1 -9.4 -2.9 80.7 92.4 79.8
Australia 78 84 0.5 -0.6 77.9 83.9 -0.1
Canada 85 86.6 87.4 -1.5 -0.4 83.1 84.7 85.5
Spain 74 73.8 73.9 0.3 -6.4 67.9 67.7 67.8
United States 100 100 100 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Finland 82 90.4 83.3 -1.6 -1.7 78.7 87.1 80.0
France 113 107.1 107.4 -9.6 -5.4 98.0 92.1 92.4
Ireland 105 109.4 104 -3.1 -1.7 100.2 104.6 99.2
Italy 94 98.5 91.9 -4.8 -8.3 80.9 85.4 78.8
Japan 71 75.8 69.6 0.0 -0.3 70.7 75.5 69.3
Norway 125 121.1 124.2 -13.0 2.4 114.4 110.5 113.6
Netherlands 102 106.3 102.2 -13.2 -0.2 88.6 92.9 88.8
United
Kingdom
79 86.2 83.7
-2.4 0.4 77.0 84.2 81.7
Sweden 86 88.9 85 -5.3 2.2 82.9 85.8 81.9
Notes: [a]: ppp 2002; [b]: 1999 EKS $.; [c]: pps.
Interpretation: If France had the same number of hours worked as the United States, its hourly productivity would be 9.6%
lower. If it had the same employment rates, its hourly productivity would be 5.4% lower. According to the OECD, “observed”
hourly productivity is 113% of that of the United States. Corrected for differences in hours worked and employment rates, the
“structural” hourly productivity consistent with this “observed” level would in France be 98% of that of the United States.
Sources: [a]:  OECD  (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/40/29867116.xls)  and  Pilat  (2004);  [b]:  Groningen  Growth  and
Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, February 2004; [c]: Eurostat, Structural Indicators
database;  [d]:  Elasticity  of  hourly  productivity  to  hours  worked  x  difference  in  hours  worked  vis-à-vis the  United  States;
[e]: column [j] of Table 9.
In every country, the “structural” level of hourly productivity (compared with the United States)
is lower than the “observed” level. The fewer hours worked (except in Australia, Japan and Spain) and
the lower employment rates (except in Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
and the United Kingdom) produce a significant rise (of over one point) in the comparative level of
“observed” hourly productivity. The gap between “observed” and “structural” productivity is often
wide: in the case of France, for instance, it is around 15 points (9.5 points and 5.5 points). It exceeds
10 points in the three largest continental European countries only (France, Germany and Italy) as well
as in the Netherlands and Norway, and 5 points in Spain. Conversely, it is insignificant (less than
1 point) in only two countries, Australia and Japan, where hours worked and employment rates are
both very similar to the levels observed in the United States.
Of the four countries where “observed” levels of hourly productivity are higher than in the United
States (France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway), only two also have higher “structural” levels of
hourly productivity than the United States. They are Ireland and Norway, both small countries where
the observed productivity levels are “artificially” raised by salient features, namely the impact of profit
transfers stemming from very atypical corporate tax incentives in the case of Ireland,16 and a highly
capital-intensive structure with the focus on three industries -- oil, timber and fisheries -- in the case of
Norway. Apart from those two special cases, the fact that “structural” hourly productivity levels are
higher in the United States than elsewhere shows that the US is indeed setting the “technical frontier”
in terms of productive efficiency and that other countries are lagging behind to varying degrees.
Leaving  aside  the  two  small  countries  (Ireland  and  Norway)  with  their  special  profiles  as
described above, there is evidence that the gaps between “structural” and “observed” relative hourly
productivity  levels  are  all  the  greater  (in  absolute  terms)  when  the  “observed”  relative  hourly
productivity levels are also high (see figure). It is even clearer if we exclude Spain, which is still
catching  up  in  terms  of  productivity.  This  confirms  that  the  high  levels  of  “observed”  hourly
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productivity  in  some European countries  are  largely  attributable  to  their  fairly  low hours  worked
and/or  employment  rates,  compared  with  the  United  States,  and  the  diminishing  returns  to  both
parameters.
Figure. “Observed” relative hourly productivity level (%) and gap between “structural” and “observed”
relative hourly productivity level (in points)
Relative levels are defined vis-à-vis the United States
“Observed” relative level of hourly productivity
France Netherlands ItalyGermany Spain Finland Sweden Canada
United Kingdom Australia Japan
R2 = 0.740
R2 = 0.827 excluding Spain
Gap between “structural” productivity – “observed” productivity
Source: “observed“ relative hourly productivity: OECD (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/40/29867116.xls) and Pilat (2004); gap
between “structural” and “observed” relative hourly productivity: authors’ calculations, see text.
Concluding remarks
This study confirms the diminishing returns to hours worked and the employment rate.  With
regard to the employment rate, this diminishing-returns effect is particularly marked in the younger
age group (15 to 24) and the older age group (55 to 64) within the working-age population. On that
basis, the study shows that the productivity performance of some European countries compared with
the United States is largely attributable to the lower levels of hours worked and employment, both of
which display sharply diminishing returns. These, in turn, are attributable to the effects of fatigue in
the case of hours worked, and to the concentration of employment among adults (aged 25–54) in the
case of the employment rate.
Leaving  aside  some  smaller  countries  whose  apparent  productivity  performance  is  largely
attributable to salient features (Ireland and Norway), the United States is the country with the highest
“structural” level of hourly productivity and is therefore setting the “technical efficiency frontier» for
industrialised countries. The US lead in terms of ICT dissemination and production goes some way
towards explaining its higher “structural” level of hourly productivity, a result that is consistent with
previous studies (including Gust and Marquez 2002, 2004).
This analysis suggests that the difference in per capita GDP between European countries and the
United States is attributable not only to these lower levels of hours worked and employment but also
to lower “structural” productivity. In other words, the lower level of per capita GDP can certainly not
be interpreted solely as the expression of a social or “lifestyle” choice combining superior productivity
with a stronger preference for more leisure time. It also stems from a productivity gap with the United
States. This calls for two economic policy recommendations:
• The first  policy recommendation is  to look into ways of enabling all  of the industrialised
countries to close their productivity gap with the United States. This gap, widely analysed by
the  OECD  (2003a,  2003b),  is  due  to  many  possible  causes,  including  lower  average
educational  attainment  in  the  working-age  population,  less  ICT production  and  diffusion,
regulatory rigidities on goods and labour markets -- rigidities that lessen competitive pressure,
eventually constitute rent and hamper certain flexibilities in the mobilisation of factors of
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production,  lowering  overall  factor  productivity.  These  numerous  potential  causes  are
interdependent.  For  instance,  because  rigidities  on  goods-  and  labour-markets  may  affect
prices and hamper flexibilities, they may be one of the reasons for the delay in ICT diffusion.
Furthermore, ICT use requires more highly skilled labour than other techniques, and a less
skilled labour force may also mean less ICT diffusion.
• The  second  policy  recommendation  is  to  look  into  the  real  nature  of  the  social  choice
discussed here, which may to some extent be prompted by various tax measures (see Cette
and Strauss-Kahn, 2003). With regard to the employment-rate and working-hour differential
between many European countries and the United States, for instance, Prescott (2003) holds
institutions largely responsible while Blanchard (2004) attributes even greater responsibility,
especially  regarding working hour  differentials,  to  the  expression of  preferences,  in  other
words social choices. Prescott’s analysis (2003) assumes strong labour-supply elasticities to
income from work, elasticities which are currently the focus of major debate in the literature
(see for instance Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2005). The work by Prescott (2003) and
Blanchard (2004) suggests that regulatory arrangements and more broadly institutions should
avoid  incentives  for  lesser  use  of  available  labour  resources  and  shift  towards  greater
neutrality.  This  option,  which  applies  more  specifically  to  the  younger,  older  and  female
members  of  the  working-age  population,  with  differentials  that  vary  across  the  relevant
European countries, would result in greater labour resource utilisation and hence higher per
capita GDP. Even taking into account the ensuing decline in labour productivity, better labour
resource  utilisation  would  make  it  possible  to  close  the  gap  in  per  capita  GDP between
European countries and the United States.
These findings should of course be viewed with the usual caution, given the weakness of both the
data used and the econometric investigations. They should be backed up with more robust analysis,
taking  into  account  for  instance  differences  in  employment  rates  in  the  working-age  population
depending on educational  achievement.  The insight  they  provide,  however,  constitutes  a  valuable
springboard for reflection.
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ANNEX: VARIABLES USED
Table A1. Sources and definition of variables used
Variable Description Sources Average
21
countries
Standard
deviation
21
countries
Average
14
countries
Standard
deviation
14
countries 
PH GDP per hour worked (index) OECD: Productivity
Database
H Average annual hours worked
per employee (in hours)
1 – OECD Labour Market
Statistics
2 – Groningen: Total
Economy Database
1 775 239 1 674 162
ER Employment rate OECD Labour Market
Statistics
0.636 0.073 0.652 0.076
CUR Capacity utilisation rate OECD: Main Economic
Indicators standardised by
the authors)
0.831 0.019 0.831 0.019
ITPR ICT production (% of GDP) OECD: STAN database 0.050 0.018 0.054 0.017
ITIR ICT investment (% of GDP) OECD: Productivity
Database
13 pays
2.680
13 pays
0.892
INVR Investment rate OECD Economic Outlook 0.220 0.050 0.201 0.032
IUR Internet user ratio (per 1 000
inhabitants)
World Bank 114 140 141 151
Q Volume GDP in PPP and in
1995 $US 
OECD Economic Outlook 9.7E+11 1.7E+12 1.3E+12 2.0E+12
P Consumer price index OECD: Main Economic
Indicators
PER Public employment rate (% of
total employment)
OECD Economic Outlook 0.178 0.066 0.187 0.073
SER Self-employment rate (% of
total employment)
OECD Economic Outlook 0.183 0.104 0.147 0.068
PTR Part-time employment rate (%
of total employment)
OECD Labour Market
Statistics
0.139 0.078 0.172 0.063
ITSR ICT spending rate (% of GDP) World Bank 0.062 0.018 0.067 0.016
R&DSR Research and Development
(% of GDP)
OECD Economic Outlook 0.017 0.008 0.020 0.007
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Table A2. Selected descriptive statistics on the variables used 
Variable Average 21
countries
Standard deviation
21 countries
Average 14
countries
Standard deviation
14 countries
∆ph 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.007
∆h -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004
∆ER 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.012
∆CUR 0.001 0.019 0.0005 0.020
∆p-1 0.020 0.021 0.010 0.006
ER_m1524 0.046 0.012 0.048 0.012
ER _m2554 0.276 0.019 0.280 0.017
ER _m5564 0.039 0.012 0.041 0.011
ER _w1524 0.039 0.012 0.042 0.013
ER_w2554 0.211 0.037 0.214 0.040
ER_w5564 0.025 0.011 0.027 0.012
ER_1524 0.085 0.024 0.089 0.025
ER_2554 0.487 0.049 0.494 0.053
ER_5564 0.064 0.022 0.068 0.022
ER_M 0.361 0.031 0.370 0.029
ER_W 0.275 0.049 0.283 0.054
Note: The country groupings in this table are explained in the section on “Labour productivity …”.
28
1 . This concept of a “technical frontier” is better suited to a more refined sectoral approach, or even
to the production of a single good. It is used here for convenience to cover the whole of a country’s economy.
2 . See for instance Prescott (2003), Blanchard (2004) or Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005).
3 . Both studies also provide a broad review of the literature on these issues.
4 . These  three  measurements  are  all  initially  based  on  national  accounting  data  drawing  on
conventional options which may differ across countries. The differences may relate, for instance, to the treatment
of the production of financial services, military spending or software spending. Furthermore, the differences
observed in these measurements within a single country may have many different causes, including the source of
employment data selected (Labour Force Survey or National Accounts), more or less recent revisions of GDP
measurements or the conventions used to work out purchasing power parities (see Pilat, 2004; Cette, 2004, 2005
also gives an overview of various sources of statistical uncertainty).
5 . Based on a study conducted by INSEE on microeconomic data, Malinvaud (1973) states that since
there are no better indicators than those of the type mentioned above, a coefficient of ½ should be applied to
measure the impact that a reduction in hours worked has on hourly productivity. In view of the lesser effects of
fatigue due to the decrease in average hours worked over recent decades, more recent research now applies a
coefficient of ⅓ or ¼ (see Cette and Gubian, 1997).
6 . This is also the analysis given by Giuliani (2003). While not set out in detail, Wasmer (1999)
supposes that the labour force composition affects productivity.
7 . As this variable is available on a smaller sample than for the other variables, its introduction as an
explanatory variable has been treated separately.
8 . The effect on hourly productivity of a variation in the ratio of part-time jobs to total employment
(∆PTR) is in theory uncertain, owing to the presence of the variable for the rate of change in average hours
worked (∆h) on the list of explanatory variables. The variable  ∆PTR, for instance, is aimed at distinguishing
between the special effect on productivity of a change in the share of part-time work and that of a change in full-
time working hours.
9 . The results referred to here are from Tables 2, 5 and 6 of Gust and Marquez (2002, 2004).
10 . However, we have checked that  this difference in  the sample (presence or not  of Ireland and
period of estimation) has, in itself, little impact on the estimation results.
11 . The results referred to here are from the table on page 108 of Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004).
12 The results referred to here are from the table on page 106 of Bélorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004).
13 . Given relationship (1), then: )(.
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Recalculated in this way, coefficient ã2,i,t takes on a specific value for each country i and each year t. The
recalculated effect ã2 of an increase in the aggregate employment rate is therefore obtained using the mean M(i,t)
of ã2,i,t for all countries i and the whole of period t. The same method is used to calculate an aggregate effect on a
group of categories (e.g. women, or young people).
14 . The  long-term effect  is  the  short-term effect  divided  by  1.393,  the  estimated  value  â1 of  the
coefficient of the autoregressive term ∆ph-1 of relationship (1) being equal to -0.393 (see Table 5, column [8]).
15 . Thus the effects (ERPE) on hourly productivity of differences in the employment rate, of each
working-age category j, of country i compared with the United States are calculated as follows:
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Here, the term ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
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employment rate vis-à-vis the United States, while the term ∑ ⎥⎥⎦
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corresponds to the effect of differences in the structure of the working-age population. The effects of these
differences in structure are always small in scale, which is why this second term is not broken down into its six
component parts here.
16 . Greenan and L’Horty (2004),  for  instance,  show that  GDP is  some 20% higher  than GNP in
Ireland, partly due to tax incentives resulting in the location of the profits of multinational companies in this
country.
